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Abstract 
 
Recent research has argued that human capital has become the key driver of city growth 
and that there is a widening divergence between high and low-skill cities. This skilled city 
view includes several stylised propositions. The first is that more skills and human capital 
generate stronger economic growth; the second is that already skilled cities are becoming 
ever more skilled; and, the third is that larger cities tend to have stronger concentrations 
of, and faster growth in, high-skilled, cognitive occupations. Using a detailed dataset for 
occupational change in 85 urban Travel to Work Areas in Britain between 1981 and 2015, 
this paper evaluates whether these propositions apply to British urban evolution, and how 
they relate to the ‘hollowing-out’ of medium-skilled jobs. The results confirm the close 
interactive relationship between growth and high-skilled occupations. However, some of 
the skilled city propositions, such as ‘smart cities becoming smarter’, and a positive 
relationship between agglomeration and high skilled employment growth, do not apply in 
Britain where other factors have been more important. The pattern of high-skill growth 
has shown a strong regional dimension, and the ‘emergence’ of newer smaller cities, 
particularly in southern England has been more evident than the ‘resurgence’ of large core 
and industrial cities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The accumulation of skills and human capital are central to the process of urban economic 
growth (Chinitz 1961).  Moreover, the significance of skilled occupations is said to have 
increased dramatically in recent decades and become crucial to post-industrial city growth 
and the main priority for urban economic policy (Cheshire et al. 2014, HM Government, 
2011). According to Parkinson (2016, p. 632), for example, “A skilled workforce is a critical 
feature of competitive cities. Modern economies increasingly depend upon knowledge-
intensive sectors, even within manufacturing. Policymakers and businesses typically rate 
this as the most significant single factor”.  
 
Despite the broad consensus on the importance of skills, much less agreement exists on 
exactly how skills and skilled occupations are changing across cities.  Instead, there are 
several influential narratives about how skills are shaping the dynamism of city economies. 
One argues that there is an increasing divergence between high and low-skill cities which 
is producing a ‘winner takes all’ geography in which skilled people are drawn to successful 
cities (Moretti, 2013). Another envisages the consolidation of skills-equilibria in different 
urban economies with labour supply and demand for skilled occupations at different skill 
levels becoming matched at low, medium or high positions (Green, et al., 2016). A further 
interpretation, popular in the UK, is that economic growth has been held back by 
education failures, shortages in skills supply, insufficient connection with employer needs, 
and limited devolution over skills policy (Brown et al. 2018, CBI, 2016).  
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Despite these debates, there has been a relative lack of research on the geography of skilled 
occupations and their changes through time, especially outside of the US1. Furthermore, 
skills, and their use and application in particular jobs, are notoriously difficult to measure 
directly (Bacolod et al., 2009). This paper aims to begin to remedy this lack of research. It 
starts by examining research on the rise of the ‘skilled city’ and identifies its three main 
propositions about the relations between city characteristics and skilled jobs. The first is 
that the proportion of the workforce in high-skilled occupations has driven stronger 
employment growth across cities. The second is that initially high skilled cities have seen 
faster growth in high-skilled occupations, thereby widening the gap with less skilled cities. 
The third is that larger and denser cities have generated higher growth rates in higher-
skilled occupations. Using a detailed and comprehensive dataset for occupational change 
in 85 cities between 1981 and 2015, the paper assesses whether these propositions help to 
explain the economic performance of cities in Britain. Addressing a further neglected area 
in the skilled city work, it then briefly examines the pattern of occupational polarisation 
seen in British cities over this period and identifies important regional differences.  The 
results confirm the close interactive relationship between growth and high-skilled 
occupations. However, some of the other ‘skilled city’ arguments, such as ‘smart cities 
becoming smarter’ and a positive relationship between agglomeration and high skilled 
employment growth, have only limited applicability in Britain.  
 
 
2.  The Rise of the ‘Skilled City’ 
 
It has long been recognised that human capital is a key constituent of endogenous urban 
development and long-run city growth (Martin and Sunley, 1998; Simon and Nardinelli, 
2002; 1996). Glaeser and Saiz (2003) find that, for more than a century, better educated 
cities in the US have grown faster than comparable cities with less human capital (see also 
Glaeser et al. 2014; Simon, 1998).  Many authors have since gone further to argue that the 
significance of human capital has increased and become the key engine of city growth. 
Indeed, this research has been a principal contribution in the resurgence of urban 
economics and its strong influence on city policy since the 1990s (Cheshire et al., 2014). 
                                                 
1 Indeed, much of the most influential literature on skills, education and city growth is based on analyses 
for the United States, especially the writings of Glaeser and co-authors (see, for example, Glaeser and Saiz, 
2003; Glaeser and Berry, 2006) and Moretti, (2013). Peck (2016) argues that Glaeser’s significant policy 
influence represents the construction of a neoliberal urban orthodoxy.  
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Glaeser (2009, 49) writes, “In the twenty-first century, idea production appears to have 
become the major business of many metropolitan areas, and skilled workers seem to be 
the most important element in the production of ideas”. Thus, “the key to urban success 
or failure in today’s economy is simple: high-skill cities prosper; low-skill ones stagnate or 
decline” (Glaeser 1996, p. 3; see also Glaeser et al., 1995; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). 
Moretti (2013), referring to the US experience, describes a ‘Great Divergence’ beginning 
in the 1980s between ‘innovation-hub’ cities with high educational levels, generating 
abundant knowledge spill-overs, and cities with poorly educated workforces and outdated 
industries.  
 
The key argument here is that that the geographical concentration of skilled and educated 
people in cities raises productivity growth, underpinned by the stronger external economies 
of agglomeration in skilled cities (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Furthermore, globalisation 
has increased the economic returns from knowledge creation and dissemination, and raised 
the rewards for face-to-face knowledge sharing (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Glaeser, 2012). 
In global North economies, cities have flourished as amenity and consumption nodes 
rather than production centres, and as magnets and generators of creative talent (ibid.).  
 
Several main and stylised propositions can be distilled from this literature for closer 
investigation in Britain’s cities.  While there is varying support for, and interpretations of 
the causes of, these propositions, they have become recurrent and core themes echoed in 
many policy reports. The first is that more skills and human capital generate stronger economic 
growth through positive externalities that raise productivity and innovation. These externalities and 
spill-overs are evidenced by the wage premium paid to skilled workers in cities (Glaeser 
and Maré, 2001; Gabe, 2009). In a post-industrial economy, occupations that require 
cognitive and social intelligence skills and assets are growing, whereas those that require 
physical skills are declining (Scott, 2009)2.  Hence, it is argued that cities with greater shares 
of cognitive and social types of skill are most likely to grow fastest (Bacolod et al., 2009), 
and to better absorb knowledge and prove more adaptable. Differences in the kinds of 
skilled labour concentrated in cities explain their divergent economic performance 
(Markusen and Schrock 2006), highlighted and popularised by claims about the ‘creative 
class’ in urban economic growth (Florida et al., 2012).  
                                                 
2 Although in the UK it should be noted that there is evidence that the growth in skills demand and 
particularly demand for numeracy and literacy skills has faltered since 2012 (Henseke et al, 2018 ) 
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The second proposition is that skilled cities are becoming more skilled. As Glaeser and Berry 
(2006) put it, ‘smart places are getting smarter’. More initially highly skilled and educated 
cities are attracting more skilled labour (Berry and Glaeser, 2005). In Moretti’s (2013, p. 5) 
terms, “The success of a city fosters more success, as communities that can attract skilled 
workers and good jobs tend to attract even more. Communities that fail to attract skilled 
workers lose further ground”. Although high-skill cities have higher factor costs, skilled 
workers are more productive, earn higher wages and move to these cities to get on career 
‘escalators and elevators’ and benefit from externalities and networks that boost their 
experiences, earnings and careers (Gordon et al., 2015). The causes of this divergence have 
been debated vigorously.  A people-focused approach has argued that it is driven by the 
location decisions of skilled individuals. This claims that skilled people choose to live close 
to other skilled people to again access to valuable knowledge ‘windfalls’ and to enjoy 
amenity values and higher quality consumption facilities in larger urban centres (Glaeser et 
al., 2001). Florida’s creative class is a version of this approach, albeit with a somewhat 
different and wider understanding of amenities and pull-factors that are assumed to operate. 
An alternative production-based approach sees the uneven growth of industries, firm and 
innovation systems as the principal underlying cause of skill divergence (Moretti, 2013; 
Storper and Scott, 2009).  Skilled cities are attracting industries that require more skills 
(Simon, 2004). However, both approaches see cumulative skill divergence as a key pattern.  
 
A third stylised proposition is the positive relationship between city size and skills. Here, 
it is argued that larger cities tend to have stronger concentrations of the high-skilled occupations and 
capabilities and generate faster growth in these occupations. A strong complementarity between city 
size, skills and learning is found in studies in the US and some other countries, reflected in 
the positive relationship between city size and productivity. Puga (2017) concludes that 
bigger cities have a disproportionate share of high skilled occupations and these size 
differences are growing (see also Florida et al., 2012).  The literature acknowledges some 
qualifications and complications, and in some accounts city size is not sufficient for high 
skilled growth.  Large and dense cities act as magnets for educated people only when they 
offer amenities that are attractive to discerning residents (Glaeser et al., 2001; Glaeser, 2012; 
Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Markusen and Schrock (2006) report that some high skill, 
higher order occupations have grown fast in second-order metropolitan areas, but note 
that these may be part of world city conurbations because the largest cities exert a 
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gravitational force on high order jobs. According to Scott (2009, p. 224), cognitive skills 
bear a distinct relationship to the urban hierarchy such that: 
 
large metropolitan areas in the USA are marked by especially dense concentrations 
of cognitive human capital, or, in other terms, mental, behavioural and cultural 
assets embodied in the labour force. Small metropolitan areas, in contrast, have a 
much greater proclivity to harbour human capital assets that entail more physical 
aptitudes such as strength, stamina, manual dexterity and mechanical skills.   
 
As Storper and Manville (2006) cautioned, this proposition about size can obscure different 
types of agglomeration because it includes the ‘emergence’ of sprawling newer cities as well 
as the ‘resurgence’ of older large and industrial cities. 
 
The growth of high skilled occupations, of course, tells only part of the story about recent 
occupational change. While the ‘skilled city’ work has focused on the top of the 
occupational hierarchy, the growth at the bottom and a decline in middling wage and 
medium skill jobs has been relatively neglected. The resulting occupational polarisation has 
been found in many mature industrialised and especially urban economies (Goos et al. 
2014; Oesch and Rodriguez Menes, 2011; Michaels and Van Reenen, 2010). This 
‘hollowing-out’ is explained primarily in terms of the impacts of computer and information 
technology raising demand for educated labour and eliminating routine and semi-skilled 
work (Autor et al., 2003; Autor, 2015). It is has also been increased by the global 
outsourcing of routine manufacturing employment (Hijzen et al., 2005; Gagliardi et al., 
2015). The geography of this ‘hollowing-out’ has received relatively less attention, however, 
and its impacts across cities remain under-studied. Moretti (2013) argues that traditional 
manufacturing cities have suffered most from ‘hollowing-out’ and that this underlies their 
divergence from ‘innovation hubs’. The implication, then, is that there is a negative 
relationship between high skilled growth and the ‘hollowing-out’ of middle-skill 
occupations across cities.  
 
Most of the empirical evidence in the ‘skilled city’ literature pertains to US cities (Dijkstra 
et al, 2013). There has been much less work on other countries, where the lack of detailed 
data has constrained analysis. It is unclear whether, how and when differences and path 
dependencies in other national and urban contexts continue to matter (Christopherson, 
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2002). To begin remedying this gap, this paper aims to explore these main ‘skilled city’ 
propositions in the British context. Human capital in Britain has certainly been subject to 
divergent spatial trajectories (Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2000; Champion et al., 2014; 
Green, A., 2016; Cheshire et al., 2017), although there is some debate on their significance 
(McCann, 2016). The UK has moved strongly to a service economy within a relatively de-
regulated, although not highly geographically mobile, labour market, and its cities have 
experienced divergent economic trajectories since the early 1990s, if not before (Martin et 
al., 2016; Martin et al., 2017).  Given that human capital is endogenous to economic growth, 
we would expect to find strong relations between skills and city divergence. Here, we test 
whether and how far the skilled city propositions explain the experience of British cities. 
Beforehand, a note on data issues is in order. 
 
 
3. Measuring Skills and Defining Occupations 
 
Measuring and tracking human capital and skills present substantive methodological 
challenges. It is difficult directly to assess the combinations of skills that workers are using 
in their work in different occupations at different times, and there are only a limited 
number of often partial skill surveys. Most studies are forced use some kind of proxies of 
skills.  The skilled city literature discussed above often uses percentage of population 
educated to degree level.  However, this educational measure has been widely criticised as 
some types of skill are acquired through experience and interactions with others rather 
than through formal education, and a college education is not a prerequisite for all high 
knowledge occupations (Florida et al., 2012; Gabe, 2009; Florida and Mellander, 2018).  
Occupation profiles are a more direct proxy of skill levels and can show more detailed 
types of skill differentiation (Bacolod et al., 2009).  Occupations are themselves, of course, 
made up of a bundle of tasks and activities that may change over time. In the UK, skill 
surveys indicate that skills, and especially literacy and inter-personal or influencing skills, 
in the same occupation have been increasing (Green, F. 2016).  Nevertheless, it is still 
useful to classify occupations by the bundles of tasks and skills that they involve in order 
to distinguish occupations that involve mainly cognitive and social intelligence skills from 
those using mainly physical and manual skills.  
 
8 
 
No official, regularly collected and detailed time series data on occupations or skills are 
produced for the various cities in the UK3. Thus, a major step in the analysis involved the 
construction of as accurate and consistent a data set as possible from the few data sources 
on occupations and skills that do exist. Here, the method uses the division of standard 
occupational groups into four skill levels by the UK Commission for Employment and 
Skills (Table 1).  Jobs are classified in groups according to the concept of  ‘skill level’ and 
‘skill specialisation’. The four levels are distinguished by the duration of  training and/or 
work experience as well as the qualificatioin level required,  and Table 2 shows the 
allocation of  occupational groups to the four Skill levels. Focusing on the skilled city 
propositions, the Level 4 groups is of specific interest because its members have well above 
average levels of ‘data’ and ‘people’ skills (Dickerson and Wilson, 2012). A degree level 
qualification is normally required for jobs at Level 4 whereas Level 3 occupations typically 
require technical qualifications. However, Skill Level 4 usefully excludes those graduates 
who are not working in high-skilled jobs and includes non-graduates who have risen to 
senior management corporate positions.  
 
TABLES 1 AND 2  ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
In this paper, we focus on 85 cities in Britain between 1981 and 20154. The cities are 
defined geographically by Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) using 2011 boundaries. The key 
criterion is that 75% of the total workforce both lives and resides in this area. On this basis 
we identified 85 cities with populations above 200, 000 5 .  This dataset construction 
involved three main stages: i) estimating Standard Industrial Classifcation – Standard 
Occupational Classification (SIC-SOC) matrices of employment by sector and occupation 
                                                 
3 While th Labour Force Survey collects such data, the robustness of the data at smaller spatial scales is 
poor.  
4 These are the cities that are the basis of the larger Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project 
on the economic performance of British cities over 1971-2015, of which this paper forms a part. The 85 
cities concerned accounted for 84 percent of UK employment in 2015. 
5 This self-containment figure is based on the total workforce and produces 228 Travel To Work Areass. 
However, TTWAs for different occupational groups vary in size and the degree of containment in these 
areas will be lower for the highest skilled workers. The Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2016) estimates 
that there are 153 TTWAs for the highest qualified employees and 461 for the lowest qualified. Our cities 
therefore represent amalgamations of smaller, lower skilled TTWAs and have significant external 
commuting flows for the highest skilled. On the whole, however, using TTWAs to define our cities results 
in urban areas that have greater meaning as functional labour markets than cities defined as, say, 
administrative units or as contiguous physically built-up spaces. 
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for each TTWA drawing upon the Working Futures 2014-24 matrices. Working Futures is 
a quantitative assessment of employment trends based on a detailed and comprehensive 
mnodel of the UK labour market, produced by the Warwick Insitute for Employment 
Research. We then calculated SIC-SOC data for local authority districts and converted 
these to TTWAs; ii) adjusting and scaling the first estimates of TTWA SIC-SOC matrices 
to ensure consistency with employment by occupation data and TTWA employment by 
sector data for 1981-2014; and, iii) extending the 2014 SIC-SOC matrices backwards to 
produce consistent series for 1981-2014 which involved calculating the growth rates of 
TTWA occupation shares of employment over the period, and applying these to 
employment data by sector for each year to produce TTWA employment by occupation 
for 1981-2014. A final data review ensured the results were internally consistent with the 
input data and the data calculation processes, and credible (e.g. not unusually volatile or 
showing other unusual patterns).  
 
The dataset is based on rigorous estimations and utilises the most detailed information 
available. However, it is not free of some inconsistences and breaks over time, for example 
as new job classifications appear and data collection methods alter. In many TTWAs there 
are data disjunctures around 1991-1992. This is because all historical time series on the 
growth of occupational employment in the UK, including those estimated by the Warwick 
Institute for Employment Research’s (IER) for ‘Working Futures 2014-24’, have to rely 
upon the Labour Force Survey (see Briscoe and Wilson, 2003).  While this allows the 
construction of a broadly consistent time series from the late 1970s, over the period 1979-
2012 the LFS changed occupational coding three times and each has to be bridged.  
However, the significance of changes to occupational coding have been thoroughly 
explored and found not to drive changes to top occupations (Salvatori, 2015). The 
discontinuity in 1991 is likely to be due to changes in the LFS sampling frame when it 
became quarterly in 1992. In this paper, therefore, the analysis focuses upon relative change 
over the whole period and compares cities against the national average. 
  
 
4. High Skilled Occupations and Urban Economic Growth  
 
The first ‘skilled city’ proposition is that the growth of higher skills and human capital in a 
city generate stronger economic growth through various externalities that raise 
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productivity, wages and innovation. We assess this by examining the relationship between 
total employment growth in a city over our period and the percentage of its employment 
in high skill Group 4 occupations in 1981, controlling for several other city-specific 
determinants pertinent to city economic dynamism 6 . For the latter, we examine the 
associations and relationships by including a number of variables highlighted in recent 
urban growth theories, namely: the log of employment as an indicator of city size (EMP81); 
the density of employment as an indicator of agglomeration (AGGLOM81); the shares of 
employment in manufacturing (MANSH81) and in knowledge intensive business services 
(KIBSSH81) (as indicators of economic structure); the level of productivity (PROD81); 
and, the degree of specialisation (or dissimilarity from the national industrial structure) 
measured by the Krugman Specialization Index (KSI81) 7 .  Size, agglomeration and 
specialisation in high human capital sectors are typically argued to have positive effects (see 
Duranton and Puga 2014), although there is much debate about whether specialisation or 
diversity are in better for fostering long-run city employment growth (Storper,2013;  Martin 
et al, 2016).  
 
The simple correlations between city employment growth and these city-specific variables 
are shown in Table 3). As expected, there is clearly a strong positive relationship between 
the share of high skills and employment growth: cities that initially had a high proportion 
of their employment in high skill occupations were also those that experienced the fastest 
rates of employment growth over the subsequent period. This finding is thus in line with 
the proposition that skilled cities tend to grow faster than less skilled one.   However, the 
relationships between employment growth and the indicators of city size and density are 
negative which does not support the interpretation that agglomeration has driven 
employment growth. As expected, the relationship between employment growth and 
manufacturing share is negative. The first two decades of our period, 1981-2001, saw 
sustained deindustrialization in many cities, while the correlation with KIBs share is 
positive given the transition to service-based urban economies. Cities with initially high 
productivity levels saw faster employment growth over the period which is likely caused 
                                                 
6 In this paper we examine employment growth but in an accompanying paper we focus in detail on the 
determinants of city productivity growth in the UK (see Martin et al, 2018).  
7 This is defined as  
𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑗𝑡 = ∑ |
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ | 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡is industry 𝑖
′s share of city 𝑗′s total employment, and𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ is that industry′s share 
 of total national  employment. 
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by their stronger firm dynamics and by more productive firms expanding their market 
shares. Interestingly, the specialization index is not strongly associated with employment 
growth. Specialization and the high skill share show a negative relationship, suggesting that 
to the extent that cities are specialised, it is in less skilled sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
In order to gauge whether the ‘skilled city’ findings can be replicated for our data we used 
an employment growth regression, similar to that used by Simon and Nardinelli (2002). 
The empirical verification of the skilled city work has relied primarily on regression results,  
and regression has been the main method used by the influential work on urban growth, 
Crucially, it can distinguish the effects of human capital on economic growth from other 
‘control’ variables that are often associated with the growth of a skilled labour force (see 
for example, Glaeser and Saiz 2003; Glaeser and Maré, 2006). We try here, in effect, to test 
and replicate these results. Table 4 shows the results of a least squares regression for 
employment growth using these variables. In this regression, we add selected other 
variables potentially significant to urban growth in contemporary Britain. First, after Simon 
and Nardinelli (2002), we have used regional dummies (SE, SW, etc.) to assess whether 
regional location has an effect upon employment growth over and above the other 
characteristics of cities. Second, we include a capital city dummy (CAPCIT) to test whether 
London, Edinburgh and Cardiff have benefited from a discernible devolution and political 
decision-making centre effect. Finally, we include a New Town dummy (NWDUM) to 
assess whether the New Towns in our set of cities have benefited from this status and its 
associated institutional capabilities, resources and growth opportunities. Table 3 shows our 
final regression with only significant results (p-value at 0.1 or lower).   The full regression 
is given in Appendix A.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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The regression confirms that a city’s employment growth has been strongly and positively 
affected by its relative share of high skilled workers. Indeed, this effect is stronger here 
than in other comparable studies (e.g. Simon and Nardinelli 2002).  However, the results 
do not support the claim that this is due to the agglomeration of high-skilled workers in 
large and dense cities. In fact, the results indicate that smaller and lower density labour 
market areas grew employment faster than larger and higher density ones.  The more 
productive areas in 1981 also grew most strongly in employment over the 1981-2015 
period. While its significance is marginal, there is an indication that employment growth 
was negatively affected by economic specialization for the reasons suggested above. The 
regional dummies show a strong disadvantage for some northern and western regions. 
Cities in the North East, North West, Wales and Scotland on average had less employment 
growth than in the other areas, even when taking other factors such as skills and 
productivity differences into account.  In contrast, there was a strong positive effect from 
New Town status. This may be because New Towns offered local conditions more 
conducive to employment growth than elsewhere, such as more permissive and 
streamlined planning, cheaper land and better infrastructure. However, we should be 
cautious as our set of cities include only five of the largest and most successful New Towns, 
with strong locational advantages. In the following section, we investigate whether these 
results are underlain by a divergence in skill levels across British cities.  
 
 
5. Occupational Divergence across Cities?  
 
 
As we have seen, the skilled cities research suggests that cities with more skilled 
employment profiles are growing fastest in terms of the accumulation of skilled labour. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between share of total employment in high skill (Level 4) 
occupations in 1981 and the growth of this occupation group between 1981 and 2015. If 
‘smart places are becoming smarter’, then we would expect to see a strong positive 
relationship.  The results clearly do not support the proposition and raise doubts about 
how far it applies in the case of Britain. In fact, it appears that there is only a very weak 
positive relationship, which is not statistically significant.  There are quite a number of 
cities that had relatively low levels of highly skilled occupations in 1981 but which have 
seen strong growth in these skilled jobs, and conversely, there are others which were 
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already skilled but have seen only slow growth. However, there do appear to be differences 
between cities in the north and south of the country.8 There is a group of northern cities 
that have both a weak starting point and low rates of high skill growth.  In contrast, there 
is a group of predominantly Southern cities with well above average starting levels but with 
a very large range of growth. Some of these cities have benefited from the strongest rates 
of growth while others have experienced only average high-skill growth.  Figure 1 shows 
the generally stronger outcomes in the south.9  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
 
 
There does not appear to be a simple divergent pattern between high and low skill cities. 
While the national share of employment in our high skill occupations has increased from 
24 to 26.8 percent, over 1981-2015, striking differences in the nature of urban labour 
markets have been highly persistent. Indeed, the most cities have high-skill rates that are 
around twice (near 140% of the national average) those of the least skilled cities (around 
70% of the national average) (Figure 2). What is clear is that, unlike in the US, there is little 
evidence of any new ‘great divergence’. Indeed, if anything, there is a very slight trend 
towards convergence.   
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Addressing its relative neglect, at the bottom end of the skills distribution Figure 3 shows 
the relationship between the percentage of employment in low skill group (1) and change 
over the period for both northern and southern cities. For both groups of cities, there is 
evidence of a negative relationship: TTWAs with low levels of low skill employment have 
tended to see a faster increase in these types of jobs.  There has been a greater range of 
growth in southern cities, but in general there has been a convergence as low-skilled 
employment has grown. Once again, this is at odds with the idea of a US-style ‘great 
divergence’ in skills.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Here we follow a conventional definition, and define Northern cities as those located in Scotland, Wales, 
the North East, North West, Yorkshire- Humberside and West Midlands.  
9 There are two clear outliers: Leamington Spa, which is highly skilled, and Mansfield which is very low-
skilled. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The third stylised proposition is the claim that larger cities have larger concentrations of 
high-skill occupations, and have seen faster growth in these occupations. We assess this by 
looking at relationships between city population size and change in the high-skilled and 
cognitive skills groups. Figure 4 shows that there is no evidence that the largest cities have 
seen faster growth in high-skilled occupations. Instead, there is only a very weak negative 
relationship which indicates that the larger cities in Britain (with the exception of London) 
have tended to see slower growth in high skilled occupations. At the same time, 
agglomeration, proxied here by employment density (employment per km squared), has 
not been a key driver of high-skill growth (Figure 5). The range of performance for low-
density cities has been much wider than the range of performance of higher density cities. 
Thus, the fastest growth in employment in high skilled occupations has evidently been in 
some relatively low density cities, which raises profound questions about the stylised 
relationships between agglomeration and the growth of high skilled industries and 
occupations claimed in several studies.  
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
Partly as a result of these trends, at the end of our period there is virtually no relationship 
across cities between their population size and the level of employment in high skill group 
level 4.  Any positive relationship disappears when London is excluded. We can conclude 
that size of city alone tells us little about the prevalence of skilled occupations across British 
cities. However, when we examine distance to London there does appear to be a modest 
negative relationship. Growth has been faster in high skill occupations in cities closer to 
London (Figure 6), and, in fact, a very similar relationship exists for the lowest skilled 
occupations. It may well be of course that faster high skill growth raises low skill growth 
through demand linkages. The vibrancy of the regional labour market appears to be a much 
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more significant factor than size or density of a city. The weight of evidence suggests that 
the north-south divide appears to be much more significant than either size of city, or its 
initial starting point, in terms of effects on changes to skill levels.   
 
 
 
 
 
6. Occupational Polarisation in British Cities 
 
Job polarisation has been evident in the UK’s labour market over recent decades as the 
effects of technological change and offshoring have increased high-skilled employment, 
but hollowed-out medium skill level jobs and occupations. To date, however, there have 
been few investigations of the geography of this process. To start to examine this 
geography, a conventional assessment of job quality has been undertaken and the nine 
major occupational groups ranked by the median hourly wages level in 1998 (Table 5).  
These wages are based on SOC 1990 groups, whereas our analysis is based on SOC 2010, 
so there may be some small discrepancies between the make-up of the major occupational 
groups. To address these, we have therefore compared the rankings of the occupational 
groups in 1998 with those in 2016. The only change is the administrative and secretarial 
group has jumped over process, plant and machine operatives in terms of hourly wage. 
With this exception, the rankings shown are stable and the relative position in 1998 
provides a useful indication of the rewards from work in each group. In the figures in this 
section the numbers of occupational groups refer to their wage rankings and not to the 
conventional numbers of the SOC Major Groups.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the share of employment in these occupational groups in northern and 
southern cities in 1981. At that time northern cities had a higher share in occupational 
groups associated with manufacturing such as skilled trades (4), and plant and process 
operatives (5), while southern cities already had higher shares in the skilled and professional 
occupations (1 to 3).  Figure 8 displays the changes in shares over the period and suggests 
there has been a trend towards a convergence in occupational structure. Such shifts have 
been stronger in northern cities where the shares at the top and bottom of the scale have 
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been higher, and the middling occupation groups in these cities have fallen to a much 
greater degree.  On these measures, polarisation has been stronger and more disruptive in 
northern cities. We can investigate some of the causes further by looking at the absolute 
rates of change in these same occupation groups.  
 
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE  
 
 
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the annual average change in each of the major occupational groups 
(ranked according to wages). It shows that the fastest employment growth has been in the 
Group ranked 7 (caring, leisure and other service occupations) followed by highest ranked 
professional occupation group.  Nationally, the middle-wage occupation groups ranked 4 
(skill trades) and 5 (process, plant and machine operatives) have either stagnated or 
declined. Overall, the findings confirm that the UK has seen a huge growth in relatively 
low skilled and low-wage jobs which is indicative of a shift in growth away from higher 
productivity toward lower productivity service industries.  Again, there are significant 
differences between northern and southern cities.  It is notable that in both sets of cities 
employment growth has been strong in Groups 6 (administrative and secretarial), 7 (care 
and leisure), and 8 (sales and customer service). Southern cities have seen marginally faster 
growth in elementary low-skilled occupations.  For the professional group, growth in 
northern cities has been slightly lower than in southern cities, and much lower in the 
manager and senior officials group, which, given the growth in public sector employment 
over the period, is an indication of a much less dynamic private sector in these cities. The 
most significant contrast is in the middle of the distribution; while employment growth in 
middle wage occupations in southern cities has been low, in northern cities it has been 
negative. Job polarisation, then, appears more pronounced in northern cities.  
 
 
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE  
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Smaller, traditionally industrial northern cities, such as Stoke, Sunderland and 
Middlesbrough have tended to see only very weak growth in higher-paying occupations 
and have benefited to only a small degree from the rise of professional and managerial 
employment.  In contrast, the fastest growing smaller cities such as Milton Keynes, 
Basingstoke and Oxford have not only benefitted strongly from the growth of professional 
and managerial classes but they have also retained some growth in a range of medium-
wage occupations. Figure 10 shows the relationships between high and medium wage 
occupations. In northern cities there is little evidence of any relationship between Groups 
1 and 5, while in southern cities there is a small positive relationship. This may be due to 
the demand externalities in local labour markets generated by high-skilled jobs (Moretti, 
2013).  
 
How, then, could we explain the strength of this geographical polarisation?  It is unlikely 
that regional differences in the growth in graduate labour are primarily responsible given 
southern regions have higher concentrations (ONS, 2013). Instead, it appears that the 
impacts of information technology, automation, trade and outsourcing have had uneven 
spatial effects and that their negative effects on routine work have been felt more in cities 
that have experienced more severe deindustrialisation. While professional employment and 
the demand for high skills have grown in most cities, the reduction in middle-skill 
occupations appears more spatially uneven. In conclusion, we turn to some of the 
implications of these under-researched skill geographies.  
 
FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
 
In sum, the ‘skilled city’ view is only partially applicable to the economic evolution of cities 
in Britain since the early 1980s. There is a clear and strong relationship between the growth 
of more highly skilled occupations and total employment across these cities, reinforcing 
accounts of the recursive relationship between skilled labour accumulations and city 
economic growth (Storper and Scott, 2009). The presence of firms with more skilled 
employment is associated with faster employment growth, confirming the ‘skilled city’ 
arguments concerning the quality of firms and the mutually reinforcing combination of 
productivity, externalities, spill-over and innovation effects. But what our results also reveal 
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is that more skilled cities do not always continue automatically to increase their advantage 
over other cities in a cumulative way. Instead, it appears that the growth of skilled 
occupations waxes and wanes through time, shaped by firm and industry dynamics in 
particular cities. While the ‘skilled city’ narrative contains some recognition of these 
processes, many of its main and stylised propositions are too simplistic and are not fully 
supported by this analysis in the British context. In terms of occupational change, there is 
no evidence of a new ‘great divergence’ in skills between cities in Britain. Instead, our 
results show a substantial and persistent gap between the most and least skilled cities, a gap 
that has a clear north-south dimension. Further, there is little evidence that agglomeration 
has been a key driver of the growth in skilled occupations. While London has seen strong 
high-skilled growth for part of our period, in general the smaller and lower density labour 
market areas, most of which are in the south of England, have grown skilled employment 
faster than larger and higher density ones. This analysis therefore questions and at least 
qualifies the claim that agglomeration is the only guaranteed way of building skilled 
employment and developing new and dynamic knowledge-based urban economies. 
Regional economic differences between northern and southern regions have been more 
important than the size or density of cities.  
 
Such regional variations are important to considerations of the relatively neglected issue of 
job polarisation. Given our data, we have not been able to measure skill polarisation 
directly. Our analysis examined relative occupational polarisation and the comparative 
performance of cities. It revealed that occupational polarisation has been more marked in 
northern cites. While these cities have had faster growth in their share of employment in 
high skill occupations, their relative, and in many cases absolute, decline in medium-wage 
jobs has been stronger. This finding is consistent with studies of the impact of global trade, 
technological change and restructuring on these former manufacturing-based economies 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2016). This uneven geography of occupational change has 
contributed to a decline in economic and political cohesion in Britain and is likely to further 
exacerbate regional and urban unevenness (O’Connor, 2017).  
 
Given the significance of the skilled city narrative for urban economic policy in Britain and 
beyond, these initial results have important implications and open-up avenues for further 
work. First, given that the European urban system is known to differ from that in the US 
(Dijkstra, et al, 2013), it would be interesting to examine whether the rapid growth of skilled 
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occupations in some smaller, lower density cities, and stronger occupational polarisation 
in former manufacturing cities, have been seen across other states, or whether they are 
peculiar to the UK.  Second, a better understanding is needed of the conditions that favour 
growth in skilled employment. In particular, why are smaller and medium-sized cities 
showing such a wide range of results in terms of their occupational change? The ‘skilled 
city’ view risks over-emphasising city size, agglomeration and KIBs in misleading ways and 
relying too heavily on education as a measure of skill. Our findings suggest policy needs to 
acknowledge the potential and limitations of ‘big city resurgence’ while paying more 
attention to what has facilitated the rapid growth of high-skill sectors and firms in small 
and medium-sized cities and what else in addition to specialisation in KIBS supports urban 
employment growth.  While our results support the common policy focus on upskilling 
and increasing skill levels, the relative decline in some middle-skilled occupations in 
northern cities raises profound challenges for this approach. As demand for some of these 
skills appears to have fallen substantially, the rationale for responses seeking to raise the 
supply of people with medium-level qualifications and skills is being undermined. Indeed, 
policies seeking to speed-up the diffusion of new technologies in attempts to raise 
productivity in such cities may well intensify these patterns. City skills policy faces the 
challenge of better connecting with other local economic development strategies, devising 
complementary and co-ordinated interventions to raise the supply and demand for skills 
and supporting appropriate living wage floors (Sissons and Jones, 2016). Our analysis 
reveals that in many northern cities, the professional group is the only major high-skilled 
occupational category that has shown strong growth, typically related with public sector 
growth. Opportunities for city policy to build upon rising demand for skilled labour in 
other occupational categories are fewer and any skill shortages may be limited to tightly 
defined, specific groups within occupations. Further research on those cities where 
medium level skills have continued to increase would be valuable here. Future work should 
provide more disaggregated analyses of change in specific occupations and cities to 
strengthen the evidence for policy. The place dimension of skills change needs to be taken 
more seriously, as it may well be missed by approaches that rely on generalized 
propositions about the ‘skilled city’.   
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Appendix A   
Initial regression with insignificant results 
 
Dependent Variable: EMPLGR8115  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/14/17   Time: 13:42   
Sample: 1 85    
Included observations: 85   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.011066 1.176328 2.559717 0.0128 
HSKILLSSH81 0.020137 0.010644 1.891862 0.0630 
EMPL81 -0.148121 0.090383 -1.638818 0.1061 
AGGLOM81 -0.177150 0.071066 -2.492768 0.0152 
MANSH81 -0.001876 0.008777 -0.213719 0.8314 
KIBSSH81 -0.012991 0.016302 -0.796904 0.4284 
KSI81 -0.971807 0.563138 -1.725699 0.0892 
PROD81 0.029229 0.020680 1.413375 0.1623 
NEDUM -0.540688 0.211290 -2.558980 0.0128 
NWDUM -0.294684 0.160419 -1.836963 0.0708 
SCDUM -0.721202 0.167742 -4.299472 0.0001 
WADUM -0.573671 0.221511 -2.589812 0.0118 
LODUM 0.146824 0.463247 0.316946 0.7523 
EMDUM -0.102202 0.165313 -0.618236 0.5386 
EEDUM -0.062162 0.128728 -0.482895 0.6308 
WMDUM -0.023202 0.164221 -0.141284 0.8881 
YHDUM -0.244487 0.156473 -1.562487 0.1230 
SWDUM -0.015012 0.159301 -0.094237 0.9252 
CAPCIT 0.417022 0.267693 1.557837 0.1241 
NEWTOWN 0.543435 0.126430 4.298289 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.721973    Mean dependent var 0.756988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640703    S.D. dependent var 0.508699 
S.E. of regression 0.304921    Akaike info criterion 0.664797 
Sum squared resid 6.043496    Schwarz criterion 1.239538 
Log likelihood -8.253860    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.895974 
F-statistic 8.883680    Durbin-Watson stat 2.096874 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 1: A Summary of Skill Levels based on SOC10 groups 
A Summary of Skill Levels 
 
1 
 
 
Equates with general education, short periods of  work-related 
training, includes postal workers, hotel porters, cleaners and 
catering assistants 
 
2 
 
Occupations require a good general education plus a longer period 
of  work-related training or work experience. These include 
machine operation, driving, caring occupations, retailing, and 
clerical and secretarial occupations. 
 
3  Requires a period of  post-compulsory education, e.g. technical 
occupations, trades occupations and small businesses. Educational 
qualifications at sub-degree level and/or a significant period of  
work experience are typical. 
 
4 Includes ‘professional’ occupations and high level managerial 
positions in corporate enterprises or national/local government. 
Require a degree or equivalent period of  relevant work experience. 
 
Source: Dickerson et al. (2012, p.72-75) 
 
Table 2 Allocation of Occupational Groups to Skill Levels 
 Major Group  Sub-major Groups Skill Level 
1 Managers, directors and senior 
officials 
11 Corporate managers and 
directors 
4 
12 Other managers and proprietors 3 
2 Professional occupations 21 Science, research, engineering 
and technology professionals 
4 
22 Health professionals 4 
23 Teaching and educational 
professionals 
4 
24 Business, media and public 
service professionals 
4 
3 Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
31 Science, engineering and 
technology associate 
professionals 
3 
32 Health and social care associate 
professionals 
3 
33 Protective service occupations 3 
34 Culture, media and sports 
occupations 
3 
35 Business and public service 
associate professionals 
3 
4 Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
41 Administrative occupations 2 
42 Secretarial and related 
occupations 
2 
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5 Skilled trades occupations 51 Skilled agricultural and related 
trades  
3 
52 Skilled metal, electrical and 
electronic trades 
3 
53 Skilled construction and 
building trades 
3 
54 Textiles, printing and other 
skilled trades 
3 
6 Caring, leisure and other service 
occupations 
61 Caring personal service 
occupations 
2 
62 Leisure, travel and related 
personal service occupations 
2 
7 Sales and customer service 
occupations 
71 Sales occupations 2 
72 Customer service occupations 2 
8 Process, plants and machine 
operatives 
81 Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
2 
82 Transport and mobile machine 
operatives 
2 
9 Elementary occupations  91 Elementary trades and related 
occupations 
1 
92 Elementary administration and 
service occupations 
1 
 
Source:  Dickerson et al (20120 page 75).  
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Table 3:  Correlation Analysis 
Included observations: 85       
         
                 
Probability 
EMPLG 
1981-2015  
HSKILLSH 
1981  
     EMPL81  
 
AGGLOM81
  
  MANSH81 
  
KIBSSH81 
  
  PROD81  KSI1 
  
EMPLG 
1981-2015  1.000000        
 -----         
HSKILLSH81
  0.411877    1.000000 
 
      
 0.0001 -----        
         
EMPL81  -0.300839 0.198316 1.000000      
 0.0051 0.0688 -----       
         
AGGLOM81  -0.409570 -0.033791 0.686490 1.000000     
 0.0001 0.7588 0.0000 -----      
         
MANSH81  -0.290268 -0.331589 -0.097772 0.181434 1.000000    
 0.0070 0.0019 0.3734 0.0966 -----     
         
KIBSSH81  0.180394 0.565626 0.410862 0.242309 -0.638168 1.000000   
 0.0985 0.0000 0.0001 0.0255 0.0000 -----    
         
PROD81  0.436375 0.418524 0.138585 -0.095163 -0.523449 0.350917 1.000000  
 0.0000 0.0001 0.2059 0.3863 0.0000 0.0010 -----   
         
KSI81  -0.257554 -0.440374 -0.360619 -0.076838 0.469819 -0.432129 -0.355249 1.000000 
 0.0173 0.0000 0.0007 0.4846 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 -----  
         
         
Table 4:   Regression Analysis 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: EMPLGR1981-2015  
Method: Least Squares   
   
    
Included observations: 85   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.291223 0.905366 2.530715 0.0135 
HSKILLSSH81 0.023178 0.007938 2.919951 0.0047 
EMPL81 -0.127834 0.076444 -1.672257 0.0988 
AGGLOM81 -0.208975 0.059066 -3.537970 0.0007 
KSI81 -0.757835 0.465487 -1.628047 0.1078 
PROD81 0.034014 0.015395 2.209449 0.0303 
NEDUM -0.423869 0.161632 -2.622440 0.0106 
NWDUM -0.208209 0.115581 -1.801415 0.0758 
SCDUM -0.653933 0.128807 -5.076830 0.0000 
WADUM -0.457059 0.168791 -2.707837 0.0084 
CAPCIT 0.385966 0.210539 1.833231 0.0708 
NEWTOWN 0.570858 0.118864 4.802611 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.706619    Mean dependent var 0.756988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.662410    S.D. dependent var 0.508699 
S.E. of regression 0.295567    Akaike info criterion 0.530315 
Sum squared resid 6.377248    Schwarz criterion 0.875160 
Log likelihood -10.53840    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.669022 
F-statistic 15.98389    Durbin-Watson stat 2.132162 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
 
Table 5:   Wage-based Ranking of Nine Occupational Groups 
Median 
Wage 
Ranking  
Occupational Group 
(by Skill Level) 
 Median Hourly 
Wage £ 1998 
Median Hourly 
Wage £ 2016 
1 2. Professionals 13.81 19.75 
2 1. Managers and senior 
officials 
12.07 19.73 
3 3 Associate professional 
and technical 
9.89 15.00 
4 5. Skilled trades 7.48 11.50 
5 8. Process, plant and 
machine operatives 
6.34 10.20 
6 4. Administrative and 
secretarial 
6.28 10.54 
7 6. Caring, leisure and 
other services 
5.14 8.87 
8 7. Sales and customer 
service 
4.78 8.12 
9 9. Elementary 
occupations 
4.59 7.84 
Source: ONS Annual Surveys of Hours and Earnings 1998 and 2016 Tables 2.5 
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Figure 1:  Growth in high skill occupations (Level 4) 1981-2015 against share of 
employment in these occupations in 1981, for 85 British cities  
 
Note: R2 values refer to regression of High Skill Employment growth 1981-2015, on High Skill 
Employment levels in 1981, for Northern and Southern cities as separate groups 
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Figure 2: Relative Share of Employment in High Skill Level 4 Occupations in 
Most and Least Skilled Cities, 1981-2015, GB=100 
 
 
Figure 3:   City Employment Growth in Low Skill (Level 1) Occupations against 
Low Skill Employment Share, 1981 
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Figure 4: City Employment Growth in High Skill (Level 4) Occupations, against 
City Population size 1981 
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Figure 5:  City High Skill Employment (Level4) growth against City Employment 
Density in 1981 
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Figure 6:  City Growth in High Skilled Occupations (Level 4), 1981-2015, against 
Distance to London 
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Figure 7: Share of employment in Major Occupational Group (ranked according 
to 1998 Median Hourly Wages), in Northern and Southern Cities in 1981 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Sh
ar
e 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
in
 1
9
8
1
Major occupational group (1 = highest median wage)
Northern city mean
Southern city mean
35 
 
Figure 8: Change in Share of Employment in Major Occupational Groups in 
Northern and Southern Cities, 1981-2015 
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Figure 9: Change in employment in occupational groups ranked by median wages 
in northern and southern cities, 1981-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Change in high and medium wage occupational groups in cities, 1981-
2015 
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